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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-JOINT TENANCY-RETROACTIVITY-The recent decision by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Jacobs 1 deals with the troublesome issue of retroactivity under the federal estate tax law. The decedent whose estate was involved in this
case had paid the entire consideration for certain real estate which was
conveyed to himself and his wife as joint tenants. This transaction
took place in 1909. The decedent died in 1924, shortly after the
effective date of the Revenue Act of that year. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue included the entire value of the real estate in the
decedent's gross estate. The executors paid the tax under protest and
sued to recover. The district court held that only half the value of the
real estate could be included in the gross estate. The circuit court of
appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held, with
three justices dissenting, that the judgments below should be reversed;
that the tax should be measured by the entire value of the real estate,
and that so applied it was not invalid under the due process clause on
the ground that it was retroactive.
It is generally assumed that inter vivas gifts made in contemplation of death or to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death are immune in some degree from death transfer taxes where the
gifts are irrevocable and have been effected before enactment of the
taxing law. The extent of this immunity is described in the decisions
of the Supreme Court beginning with Nichols v. Coolidge. 2 In that
case the transferor had created an irrevocable trust, reserving a life
estate for herself and creating for her children a vested remainder
subject to be divested if they predeceased her. The Court held that a
tax on the transfer, imposed by a law enacted after the transfer but
before the transferor's death, was fatally retroactive. 3 It was thought
for some time that the reason for the Court's conclusion was the fact
that the original transfer was irrevocable and beyond recall when the
taxing law was passed, that it would be manifestly unfair to the tax1 306 U. S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939), motion to set aside judgment denied,
306 U. S. 620, 59 S. Ct. 640 (1939).
2 274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
3 The tax was levied under the Revenue Act of 1919, 40 Stat. L. 1097. A like
conclusion was reached in Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1931),
where a retroactive tax was sought to be imposed on the same transfer under Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932), c. 65, § 1.
The Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 70, § 302 (c), has been construed as not
imposing the federal estate tax on inter vivos transfers under which the transferor has
retained for his life the income from the property. May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238,
50 S. Ct. 286 (193.0). It was not until the Joint Resolution of 1931, 46 Stat. L. 1516,
was passed, that such transfers were taxable. The Joint Resolution of 1931, as reenacted in the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 279, § 803 (a), has been construed
as inapplicable to irrevocable transfers made prior to the passage of the resolution.
Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559 (1938).
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payer to permit the tax in this situation.4 But in Binney v. Long the
decedent had transferred property in irrevocable trust, reserving a life
estate for himself and creating contingent remainders in the alternative
for his children and their children, and the Court sustained a tax on the
transfer, imposed by a law enacted after the transfer but before decedent's death. The Court said that the tax was valid, because the
interest of the transferees had not become vested before passage of the
taxing law. Except for the fact that in Nichols v. Coolidge the transferees took a vested remainder subject to be divested, while in Binney
v. Long they took contingent remainders in the alternative, the two
cases are substantially alike. It is fairly clear now that the immunity
from tax adduced in Nichols v. Coolidge is based on legal rather than
practical considerations.6 In the light of Binney v. Long, Nichols v.
Coolidge stands for the proposition that a tax on an irrevocable transfer
is fatally retroactive only where the interest of the transferee has
become vested before enactment of the taxing law. 7
However, there is at least one situation in which the Court reached
a conclusion inconsistent even with this interpretation of Nichols v.
Coolidge. In Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. White,8 the Court
"45 HARv. L. REV. 156 at 158 (1931); Surrey and Aronson, "Inter Vivos
Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REV. 1332 at 1367 (1932);
Lowndes, "A Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax," 22 VA. L.
REV. 261 at 281 (1936).
11
299 U. S. 280, 57 S. Ct. 206 (1936), noted in 50 HARV. L. REV. 78;
(1937) and 36 M1cH. L. REV. 167 (1937).
6
"Having relied on legal rather than practical considerations to invalidate the
tax in Coolidge o. Long, it would be inconsistent here to rely on practical rather than
legal considerations to invalidate the same tax." Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 280
at 288, 57 S. Ct. 206 (1936).
The validity of other legislation under the due process clause has been tested
by these same ''legal considerations." Thus statutes frequently provide for judicial sale
of land affected with a future interest, upon application of any party in interest or of
any party having a present interest. Such statutes are held to be unconstitutional when
applied to vested future interests created before the statutes were enacted. See Schnebly,
"Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests by Judicial
Process," 42 HARV. L. REv. 30 at 62-70 (1928). But see l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§ 66 (1936).
7
However, some degree of retroactive taxation is permitted in connection with
irrevocable transfers, even though the interest of the transferee has become vested before
enactment of the law under which the ta:x: is sought to be imposed. Thus, if at the
time of the transfer a statute was already in force describing the transfer as one
upon which a death tax would be imposed, the transfer may be taxed according to the
schedule of rates in force at the time of the transferor's death, though that schedule is
higher than it was when the transfer was made. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S.
15, 51 S. Ct. 324 (1930); Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U. S.
160, 52 S. Ct. 46 (1931).
8
287 U. S. 577, 53 S. Ct. 290 (1932), affirming (D. C. Mass. 1930) 45 F.
{2d) 911. The same conclusion was reached in Helvering v. Bowers, 303 U. S.
618, 58 S. Ct. 525 (1938), reversing (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 790.
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sustained a tax measured by the entire value of property held by
decedent and spouse as tenants by the entirety, where the estate had
been created prior to enactment of the taxing law. Had the Court
followed Nichols v. Coolidge, the transfer would not have been taxable
at all, because creation of the tenancy accomplished an immediate and
irrevocable transfer of a vested interest in the entire property.0 But
three years later Nichols v. Coolidge received unqualified recognition
by the entire Court in White v. Poor 10 and Helvering v. Helmholtz. 11
Since that time it has been taken for granted that Third National Bank
& Trust Co. v. White was a narrow decision on tenancies by the entirety and had detracted nowise from the authority of Nichols v.
Coolidge. 12
These were the various decisions exerting the force of their logic in
United States v. Jacobs.
The Revenue Act of 1916 was the first federal law to impose a
death transfer tax on a gift effected during the life of the transferor
through the creation of a joint tenancy. It provided that the entire
value of all property held by decedent and any other person as joint
tenants, except such part thereof as may be shown to have belonged
originally to such other person, should be included in the decedent's
gross estate for the purpose of computing the federal estate tax.13 At
first this provision was not specifically retroactive, and it was construed
as requiring that only half the value of the property be included in the
measure of the tax where the joint tenancy had been created prior
to 1916, even though the decedent had supplied the whole consideration for the property. u The provision was made retroactive by the
9 Each tenant is seised of the whole estate, and the survivor is entitled to the
whole of the property. Neither tenant can alienate his interest and defeat the right
of survivorship unless the other tenant joins in the conveyance. 1 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY,§ 194 (1920).
10 296 U.S. 98, 56 S. Ct. 66 (1935).
11 296 U.S. 93, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
12 See Lowndes, "A Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax,"
22 VA. L. REv. 261 at 279--284 (1936). Perhaps the explanation of Third Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. White is that, though by reference to the "amiable fiction" of
the common law, creation of a tenancy by the entirety effects an irrevocable transfer
of the whole property, nevertheless in view of the intimate relationship between the
tenants-a tenancy by the entirety can be created only in favor of husband and wife-the spouse who had created the tenancy still retains a practical control over disposition
of the property; and this makes it impractical to treat creation of the tenancy as an
irrevocable transfer of the whole property for purposes of retroactive taxation and to
hold the transfer entirely exempt from tax under the doctrine of Nichols v. Coolidge.
13 39 Stat. L. 777, § 202 (1916): "the value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible . . . (c) To the extent of the interest therein
held jointly or as tenants in the entirety by the decedent and any other person. . . ."
14 Knox v. McElligot, 258 U. S. 546, 42 S. Ct. 296 (1922). The same result
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Revenue Act of 1924.15 Thereafter it was held that half the value of
the property might be included under the 1924 law, where the tenancy had been created prior to 1916 and the survivor had supplied
half the consideration.16
The Jacobs case was the first to raise the question whether the entire
value of the property might be included under the 1924 law, where
the tenancy had been created prior to l 916 and the decedent had
supplied the whole consideration.17 The difficulty was that by including
the entire value of the property in the measure of the tax, a tax was
imposed upon an irrevocable transfer of a vested half interest in the
property made in 1909, and this was at variance with Nichols v.
Coolidge. But the Supreme Court made no mention of Nichols v.
Coolidge, and sustained the tax measured by the entire value of the
property. The taxable event, the Court said, was not creation of the
joint tenancy, but the shift in economic benefits at decedent's death
after the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1924. It relied on Third
National Bank & Trust Co. v. White, and on the fact that joint
tenancies and tenancies by the entirety are similar in nature. Justices
McReynolds, Butler and Roberts dissented, urging ( 1) that the tax
measured by more than half the value of the property was retroactive
according to Nichols v. CoolUge, and (2) that similarity between
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety is reason enough for treating these estates alike where they have been created after enactment of
the taxing law and different treatment would afford opportunity for
tax evasion, but not where they have been created before the law was
passed and at a time when tax evasion could not have been a motive
for their creation. The logic employed by the Court in the Jacobs case
-namely, that viewing the shift in economic benefits at decedent's death
as the taxable event, the tax was prospective-did not dispose of
Nichols v. Coolidge. 18 Binney v. Long, Third National Bank & Trust
was reached in Cahn v. United States, 297 U. S. 691, 56 S. Ct. 384 (1936),
reversing (Ct. Cl. 1935) IO F. Supp. 577.
15 43 Stat. L. 304, § 302 (1924): "The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible ••• (e) To the extent of the interest therein
held as joint tenants by the decedent and by any other person .•.• (h) Subdivisions
• • • ( e) ••. of this section shall apply to the transfers, trusts, estates, interests, rights,
powers, and relinquishment of powers, as severally enumerated and described therein,
whether made, created, arising, existing, exercised, or relinquished before or after the
enactment of this Act."
16 Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157 (1932).
17 The Court had already decided that the tax might be measured by the entire
value of the property, where the joint tenancy had been created after 1916 and the
decedent had supplied the whole consideration. Foster v. Commissioner, 303 U. S.
618, 58 S. Ct. 525 (1938), affirming (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 486.
18 The decedent's executors also argued that even this logic was not enough to
justify measuring the tax by more than half the value of the property, because there
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Co. 'V. White, and cases permitting retroactive taxation of revocable
transfers 19 stand on this logic, but Nichols 'V. Coolidge does not. If this
logic had been employed in Nichols 'V. Coolidge, the tax involved
there would have been valid, since a shift in economic benefits had
occurred at the transferor's death. That case, if it is still good law,
represents the one situation in which this logic is considered of insufficient force to sustain a retroactive tax. It may be that the Court, in
ignoring Nichols 'V. Coolidge, meant to take a step in the direction of
overruling the case once and for all. If that was not its intention, the
Jacobs case merely adds to the confusion created by the earlier decisions.
The similarity between joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety
would seem to have no bearing whatever upon the question whether the
tax was fatally retroactive.
Richard S. Brawerman
was a shift in economic benefits at decedent's death with respect to only a half interest
in the property ( the half interest which accrued to the survivor by right of survivorship) and not with respect to the other half. Their argument seems to have been
this: the survivor took a half interest in the property when the joint tenancy was
created in 1909; the survivor could have alienated her interest and have converted the
estate into a tenancy in common at any time; the only shift in economic benefits to the
survivor at decedent's death, with respect to that interest, was that death removed the
hazard that the decedent might take it as survivor; that shift in economic benefits was
only theoretical, not real, considering that before decedent's death the survivor already
had power to remove the hazard by conveyance.
19 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929);
Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157 (1932).

